Understanding fundamental philosophical problems related to the notions of intentionality and mental representation. Development of a deeper insight to a number of philosophically relevant issues, primarily in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language.
1. Intentionality (2L). History of the idea. Aristotle: forms that ''enter the soul''. Thomas Aquinas and esse intentionale. Brentano on intentionality as ''mark of the mental''.
2. Ontological status of intentional objects (2L). Problems generated by Brentano's theory of intentionality. Problem of inexistence and the difference content/object (Twardowski). Problem of thoughts on non-existent objects (Meinong and theory of objects).
3. Contemporary view of intentionality (2L). Intentionality in contemporary philosophy. Mental representation. Propositional content of an intentional state. Original and derived intentionality. Content's dependence on the environment. Naturalization of intentionality.
4. Semantics of intentional states (2L). Semantic properties of propositional attitude attributions. Difference between an intensional and extensional context. Intensionality of propositional attitude attributions. De re and de dicto propositional attitude attributions.
5. Externalist theories of mental content (2L). Externalism on the content of propositional attitudes. Putnam's Twin Earth example. Burge's arthritis example (social externalism). Externalism and subjective indiscernibility (Katalin Farkas).
6. Teleosemantics I: Dretske (2L). Dretske's indicator semantics. Dretske's understanding of information (veridicality, transitivity, nomological groundedness). Representation as having a function of indication. Explaining the possibility of error.
7. Teleosemantics II: Millikan (2L). Milikan's consumer semantics. Concept of Proper function. Normal explanation and Normal condition. Representation content as a Normal condition of proper functioning of the representation's consumer.
8. Teleosemantics III: problems (2L). Problem of indeterminacy of function. Teleosemantic response: distinction between evolutionarily relevant properties from the irrelevant ones. Swampman. Teleosemantic response: historical basis of function. Issue of scientific relevance of historically based classifications.
9. Fodor's theory of asymmetric dependance (2L). Possibility of error as a key virtue of the theory. Theory of asymmetric causal dependance. Synchronic dependance of the causal relation of Y and representation of X on the causal relation of X and the representation of X. Problem of causal relation of an object subjectively indiscernible from X and the representation of X. Problem of non-instantiated properties (fictional entities).
10. Methodological individualism and explanatory importance of intentional content (2L). Fodor's claim on the irrelevance of environmentally individuated content for the explanation of behavior. Dependance of the scientific classification of objects on their causal powers. Causal inefficacy of the relational properties of intentional states. ''Wide computationalism'' (Robert Wilson).
11. ''Narrow'' mental content (2L). Distinction between ''wide'' and ''narrow'' mental content. Argument from exclusivity of mental state's intrinsic properties in causing behavior. Argument from subject's epistemically priviliged access to the contents of their mental states. Descriptivity of ''narrow'' content.
12. Arguments against externalism (2L). Segal's critique of externalism. Segal's interpretation of externalism: possessing a certain concept as dependent on the subject's relational properties. Limiting the debate on nomologically possible scenarios; critique of classical examples based on their nomological impossibility/implausibility. Possessing a concept as extensionally independent. Critique of social externalism: idiosyncratic concept possession.
13. Intentionality of perception I: content of perceptual experience (2L). Content of perceptual experience as accuracy conditions or veridicality conditions of experience. Argument from persistence of illusion. Intentionalis: supervenience of the phenomenal character of experience on the intentional content of experience.
14. Intentionality of perception II: Arguments for intentionalism (2L). Byrne's argument; change in the phenomenal character of experience is a change in the way the world is appearing to the subject. Change in the way the world is appearing to the subject implies a change in the intentional content of experience. Block's counterexample to strong intentionalism: Inverted Earth. Change in the intentional content of experience without a change in the phenomenal character of experience.
15. Intentionality of emotions and bodily sensations (2L). Intentionalism about emotions and pain. Perceptual/affective content of the experience of pain. Emotions as representations of objects external to the subject as possessing evaluative properties and causally related to bodily changes.