The objective of the course is introducing students to different philosophical aspects of introspection, or the subject's awareness of their own mental states, and understanding the relationships of the distinct aspects of the issue (e.g. metaphysical and epistemological) and its complexity.
Introspection (2L). Mental states: division on propositional attitudes and perceptual experiences. Properties of introspection: privacy, directness, contrast to perception, independence from its object, simultaneity, effort.
2. Detection models of introspection (2L). HOP (Higher Order Perception) models: inner 'scanner' (Armstrong, Lycan); problem of the lack of sensory phenomenology and change of the first-order state by introspecting it. HOT (Higher Order Thought) models: Rosenthal on introspection as thinking of our own mental states. Objection of overly demanding conditions.
3. Containment models of introspection (2L). First-order state as a part of the introspecting state. Physical containment (Shoemaker); propositional containment (Burge). Phenomenal concepts (Chalmers).
4. Epistemology of introspection (2L). Priviliged access. Infallibility, nesumnjivost, incorrigibility (Armstrong's counterexample); self-presentation (strong and weak).
5. Introspective knowledge and world knowledge, vol. I (2L). Relationship of perceptual and introspective knowledge; classical foundationalism. Introspective beliefs as basic beliefs. Problem of skepticism.
6. Introspective knowledge and world knowledge, vol. II (2L). Transparency of mental states. Transparency of belief; inferential justification of introspective beliefs. Objections. Transparency of experience; counterexamples, inverted spectrum.
7. Introspective knowledge and world knowledge, vol. III (2L). Externalism about mental content. Putnam and Twin Earth. Burge and the arthritis example. Questions about privileged access; Burge's compatibilistic response, Mckinsey on incompatibility.
8. Self-deception (2L). Intentionalist approach to self-deception; static paradox, dynamic paradox. Non-intentionalist approach to self-deception. Twisted self-deception. Morality of self-deception.
9. Experience and consciousness (2L). Block and Chalmers on 2 concepts of consciousness (A-consciousness and P-consciousness). Relationship of A-consciousness to P-consciousness: possibility of A-consciousness without P-consciousness: thought experiments (zombies), blindsight. Possibility of P-consciousness without A-consciousness: brain damage, cognitively inaccessible conscious experiences.
10. Introspection and free will (2L). Libet's experiment (reaction potential). Responses to Libet: methodological objections, veto, compatibilism. Wegner on the illusion of conscious will (pathological states, automatisms)
11. Introspection and behavior (2L). A priori theories on causes of behavior (Nisbett and Wilson). Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger). Self-observation. Pathological cases (commissurotomy).
12. Introspekcija and psychopatology (2L). Dissociative identity disorder and alienated self-consciousness. Schizophrenia and inserted thought symptoms, thought blockage, thought broadcasting... Distinction between subjectivity and agency in some pathological conscious states.
13. Unity of consciousness (2L). Types of unity of consciousness. Experiental parts theory; objection by James. Single experience theory; notion of a total conscious experience, complexity of experiental contents.
14. Folk psychology (2L). Folk psychology as a theory. Impelemntation and content of folk psychology. Folk psychology as a simulation. Simplicity of simulation theory. Hybrid theory of folk psychology.
15. Eliminative materialism (2L). Radical falsity of folk psychology (Churchlands); critique of the implications of folk psychology about the syntax and semantics of mental states. Dennett's instrumentalism. Objections to eliminative materialism: self-refutation objection, vindication of folk psychology (successful theory, minimal committments)
- Greco, Sosa: Epistemologija: vodič u teorije znanja
- Čuljak, Zvonimir (ur.): Vjerovanje, opravdanje i znanje. Suvremene teorije znanja i epistemičkoga opravdanja
- Dancy, Jonathan: Uvod u suvremenu epistemologiju
- Miščević, Nenad: Uvod u filozofiju psihologije
- Miščević, Prijić-Samaržija (ur.): Filozofija psihologije